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==Definition== |
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==Definition== |
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Burke's definition of man states: "Man is the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal, inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative), separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making, goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order), and rotten with perfection".<ref>Burke, K. (1966). ''Language as symbolic action''. Berkley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 16</ref> Essentially, Burke's definition maintains that man is distinct from other creatures by the virtue of his use of symbols to communicate, his understanding of negation, his separation from nature by his own techniques, his existence in differing social structures, and his goal to become better than he presently is. |
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Burke's definition of man states: "Man is the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal, inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative), separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making, goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order), and rotten with perfection".<ref>Burke, K. (1966). ''Language as symbolic action''. Berkley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 16</ref> Essentially, Burke's definition maintains that man is distinct from other creatures by the virtue of his use of symbols to communicate, his understanding of negation, his separation from nature by his own techniques, his existence in differing social structures, and his goal to become better than he presently is. |
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Burke refers to [[Aristotle]]'s notion of [[entelechy]], which states that we seek to reach the perfection of our kind. This, however, is not present in nature. Burke points out that a rock and a tree are perfectly acceptable as being what they are, but not so with man for he aims to be higher than he is.<ref>Burke, K. (1966). ''Language as symbolic action''. Berkley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, p.16-20</ref> |
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Burke refers to [[Aristotle]]'s notion of [[entelechy]], which states that we seek to reach the perfection of our kind. This, however, is not present in nature. Burke points out that a rock and a tree are perfectly acceptable as being what they are, but not so with man for he aims to be higher than he is.<ref>Burke, K. (1966). ''Language as symbolic action''. Berkley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, p.16-20</ref> |
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While man's striving for perfection may afford him to reach admirable goals and progress, Burke also sees man's goal of perfection as one rife with danger. He points to our concepts of perfection in accordance with other terms. One particularly clear example he gives is the perfection for which was strived by the Nazis thus alluding to the consequences to which such ambitions may lead. Lastly, Burke explains that such dichotomies of perfection give credence to man's belief in God and Devil and Heaven and Hell.<ref>Burke, K. (1966). ''Language as symbolic action''. Berkley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, p.20</ref> |
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While man's striving for perfection may afford him to reach admirable goals and progress, Burke also sees man's goal of perfection as one rife with danger. He points to our concepts of perfection in accordance with other terms. One particularly clear example he gives is the perfection for which was strived by the Nazis thus alluding to the consequences to which such ambitions may lead. Lastly, Burke explains that such dichotomies of perfection goober give credence to man's belief in God and Devil and Heaven and Hell.<ref>Burke, K. (1966). ''Language as symbolic action''. Berkley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, p.20</ref> |
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==Modern-day applications== |
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==Modern-day applications== |